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Quantum Algorithms for Classical Probability Distributions
Aleksandrs Belovs∗
Abstract
We study quantum algorithms working on classical probability distributions. We for-
mulate four different models for accessing a classical probability distribution on a quantum
computer, which are derived from previous work on the topic, and study their mutual rela-
tionships.
Additionally, we prove that quantum query complexity of distinguishing two probability
distributions is given by their inverse Hellinger distance, which gives a quadratic improve-
ment over classical query complexity for any pair of distributions.
The results are obtained by using the adversary method for state-generating input oracles
and for distinguishing probability distributions on input strings.
1 Introduction
It is customary for a quantum algorithm to receive its input and produce its output in the
form of a classical string of symbols, quantized in the form of an oracle. This is purely classical
way to store information, and, given intrinsic quantum nature of quantum algorithms, this
might be not the best interface for many tasks. Moreover, even classical algorithms make use
of other interfaces as well. For instance, classical algorithms can receive and produce samples
from some probability distribution. In this paper we study quantum algorithms working with
classical probability distributions.
Models. We analyse previously used models of accessing classical probability distributions
by quantum algorithms. We prove and conjecture some relations between them. We give more
detail in Section 3, but for now let us very briefly introduce the models.
In one of the models, used in, e.g., [17, 19, 30, 28], the probability distribution is encoded
as a frequency of a symbol in a given input string, which the quantum algorithm accesses via
the standard input oracle. In another model, e.g., [18, 2, 6], the input probability distribution
is given through a quantum oracle that prepares a state in the form
∑
a
√
pa|a〉. Finally, one
more model, used in [29, 22, 21], is similar but with additional state tensored with each |a〉.
This is the latter model that we champion in this paper. We find this model particularly
relevant because of our believe that an input oracle should be easily interchangeable with a
quantum subroutine, see discussion in [29]. It is relatively easy to see what it means for a
quantum algorithm to output a probability distribution: just measure one of the registers of its
final state. The latter model precisely encompasses all such subroutines. We conjecture that
this model is equivalent to the first model, see also [21], where a similar conjecture is made.
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Distinguishing two Probability Distributions. Additionally, we study the problem of
distinguishing two probability distributions. This might be the most fundamental problem
one can formulate in these settings. Given two fixed probability distributions p and q, and
given an input oracle encoding one of them, the task is to detect which one, p or q, the oracle
encodes. To the best of our knowledge, this particular problem has not been studied in quantum
settings, although similar problems of testing the distance between two distributions [17] and
testing whether the input distribution is equal to some fixed distribution [19] have been already
studied.
Classically one needs Θ
(
1/dH(p, q)
2
)
samples to solve this problem for any p and q, where
dH stands for Hellinger distance. This result is considered “folklore”, see, e.g. [7, Chapter 4].
We prove that for any p and q and for any of the models of access described above, query
complexity of this problem is Θ(1/dH(p, q)). This constitutes quadratic improvement over
classical algorithm for any pair of distributions p and q. Moreover, our algorithm also admits
a simple low-level implementation, which is efficient assuming the distributions p and q can be
efficiently processed.
Techniques. Our main technical tool for proving the upper bound is the version of the ad-
versary bound for state-generating oracles, which is a special case of the adversary bound for
general input oracles [11]. It is stated in the form of a relative γ2-norm and generalises the dual
formulation of the general adversary bound [31, 32] for function evaluation, as well as for other
problems [5, 27]. The dual adversary bound has been used rather successfully in construction
of quantum algorithms, as in terms of span programs and learning graphs [9, 26, 13, 8, 24], as
in an unrelated fashion [10, 4]. Our work gives yet another application of these techniques for
construction of quantum algorithms.
Our upper bound naturally follows from the analysis of the γ2-norm optimisation problem
associated with the task. We also compare our techniques with more standard ones involving
quantum rejection sampling and amplitude amplification in the spirit of [22] and show that our
techniques give a slightly better result.
As for the lower bound, we make use of the version of the adversary bound from [12]. This
is a simple generalisation of the primal version of the general adversary bound [23] for function
evaluation, and it is tailored for the task we are interested in: distinguishing two probability
distributions on input strings. Our lower bound is surprisingly simple and gives a very intuitive
justification of the significance of Hellinger distance for this problem.
2 Preliminaries
We mostly use standard linear-algebraic notation. We use ket-notation for vectors representing
quantum states, but generally avoid it. We use A∗ to denote conjugate operators (transposed
and complex-conjugated matrices). For P a predicate, we use 1P to denote 1 if P is true, and
0 if P is false. We use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
It is unfortunate that the same piece of notation, ⊕, is used both for direct sum of matrices
and direct sum of vectors, which is in conflict with each other if a vector, as it often does, gets
interpreted as a column-matrix. Since we will extensively use both these operations in this
paper, let us agree that ⊞ denotes direct sum of vectors, and ⊕ always denotes direct sum of
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matrices. Thus, in, particular, for u, v ∈ Rm, we have
u⊞ v =


u1
...
um
v1
...
vm


and u⊕ v =


u1 0
...
...
um 0
0 v1
...
...
0 vm


.
We often treat scalars as 1× 1-matrices which may be also thought as vectors.
2.1 Relative γ2-norm
In this section, we state the relative γ2-norm and formulate some of its basic properties. All
the results are from [11].
Definition 1 (Relative γ2-norm). Let X1, X2, Z1 and Z2 be vector spaces, and D1 and D2 be
some sets of labels. Let A = {Axy} and ∆ = {∆xy}, where x ∈ D1 and y ∈ D2, be two families
of linear operators: Axy : Z2 → Z1 and ∆xy : X2 → X1. The relative γ2-norm,
γ2(A|∆) = γ2(Axy | ∆xy)x∈D1, y∈D2 ,
is defined as the optimal value of the following optimisation problem, where Υx and Φy are
linear operators,
minimise max
{
maxx∈D1‖Υx‖2,maxy∈D2‖Φy‖2
}
(1a)
subject to Axy = Υ
∗
x(∆xy ⊗ IW)Φy for all x ∈ D1 and y ∈ D2; (1b)
W is a vector space, Υx : Z1 → X1 ⊗W, Φy : Z2 → X2 ⊗W. (1c)
This is a generalisation of the usual γ2-norm, also known as Schur (Hadamard) product
operator norm [14].
In a quantum algorithm with general input oracles, the input oracle performs some unitary
operation Ox on some fixed Hilbert space, where x ranges over some set D of labels, and the
algorithm has to perform a unitary Vx on some specified part of its work-space. The algorithm
knows in advance all possible Ox and which Vx corresponds to each Ox, but it does not know
which Ox it is given in a specific execution. The adversary bound corresponding to this problem
is γ2
(
Vx−Vy | Ox−Oy
)
x,y∈D
. This bound is semi-tight : it is a lower bound on the exact version
of the problem and an upper bound on the approximate version.
The γ2-norm formalism is modular in the sense that the general task of implementing a
unitary can be replaced by something more specific. For instance, assume that our task is to
evaluate a function f(x). Then the adversary bound reads as γ2
(
1f(x)6=f(y) | Ox −Oy
)
x,y∈D
. In
this case, the bound is tight: it is also a lower bound on the approximate version of the problem.
As another example, consider the standard input oracle Ox encoding a string x ∈ [q]n.
It works as Ox : |i〉|0〉 7→ |i〉|xi〉, which can be seen as a direct sum of oracles performing
transformation |0〉 7→ |xi〉. Using the modular approach, the corresponding adversary bound
becomes γ2
(
1f(x)6=f(y) |
⊕
j 1xj 6=yj
)
x,y∈D
, where
⊕
stands for direct sum of matrices (resulting
in a diagonal matrix). This is equivalent to the usual version of dual adversary for function
evaluation (up to a constant factor).
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Now we consider state-generating input oracles1. In this case, the input to the algorithm is
given by a state ψ ∈ Cm, and the algorithm should work equally well for any unitary performing
the transformation O : |0〉 7→ |ψ〉. Without loss of generality, we may assume that e0 = |0〉 is
orthogonal to Cm, thus the operator O above works in Cm+1.
The corresponding γ2-object can be defined in two alternative ways:
Lψ = ψe
∗
0 + e0ψ
∗ or Lψ = ψ ⊕ ψ∗.
In the second expression, ψ is an m× 1-matrix and ψ∗ is a 1×m-matrix, the resulting matrix
being of size (m+1)× (m+1). In the case of a function-evaluation problem, the corresponding
adversary bound is γ2
(
1f(x)6=f(y) | Lψx − Lψy
)
x,y∈D
.
Let us also state the version of the adversary bound for the decision problem with state-
generating input oracles. This is the version we will use further in the paper. Assume we have
a collection of states ψx ∈ X for x ∈ D0, and a collection of states ψy ∈ X for y ∈ D1. The task
is to distinguish the two classes of states. Let D = D0 ∪D1. Using the general case, we obtain
the following version of the adversary bound.
Theorem 2. The quantum query complexity of the decision problem with state-generating or-
acles as above is equal to γ2
(
1 | Lψx − Lψy
)
x∈D0,y∈D1
up to a constant factor.
An explicit optimisation problem for γ2
(
1 | Lψx − Lψy
)
x∈D0,y∈D1
is given by
minimise maxz∈D
(‖uz‖2 + ‖vz‖2)
subject to
〈
vx, (ψx − ψy)⊗ uy
〉
+
〈
(ψx − ψy)⊗ ux, vy
〉
= 1 ∀x ∈ D0, y ∈ D1;
uz ∈ W, vz ∈ X ⊗W ∀z ∈ D.
(2)
This result follows from general results of [11], see Appendix A. We also give a stand-alone
implementation and analysis of the corresponding quantum algorithm in Appendix B.1.
3 Models
In this section we formally define four different models how a quantum algorithm can access
a classical probability distribution p = (pa)a∈A. These models were briefly explained in the
introduction. We would like to understand relations between them, and, ideally, prove some
equivalences between them.
(i) A standard input oracle encoding a string x ∈ An for some relatively large n, where pa is
given as the frequency of a in x:
pa =
1
n
∣∣∣{i | xi = a}∣∣∣.
(ii) A standard input oracle encoding a string x ∈ An for some relatively large n, where each
xi is drawn independently at random from p.
(iii) A quantum procedure that generates the state
µp =
∑
a
√
pa|a〉 =⊞
a
√
pa. (3)
1 The results below will appear in an updated version of [11] (to appear). For completeness, we place the
proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A, as it should appear in the new revision of [11].
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(iv) A quantum procedure that generates a state of the form∑
a
√
pa|a〉|ψa〉 =⊞
a
√
paψa, (4)
where ψa are arbitrary unit vectors.
As mentioned in the introduction, model (i) is used in [17, 19, 30, 28]. It has a downside that
the probabilities pa must be multiples of 1/n. All other models are free from this assumption.
Model (ii) seems like the most obvious way to encode probability distribution as a classical
string, which a quantum algorithm can later gain access to. Up to our knowledge, this model
has not been previously used. It has a downside that the distribution p is encoded as a proba-
bility distribution over possible input strings, which is not usual for quantum algorithms. The
acceptance probability of the quantum algorithm depends both on the randomness introduced
by the algorithm and the randomness in the input.
Model (iii) is the one used in [18, 2, 6]. And model (iv) is used in [29, 22, 21]. Both of these
two models assume that the input oracle prepares a quantum state, which again is not very
common for quantum algorithms.
Proposition 3. We have the following relations between these models.
(a) Models (i) and (ii) are equivalent assuming n is large enough. More precisely, no quantum
algorithm can distinguish models (i) and (ii) encoding the same probability distribution
unless it makes Ω(n1/3) queries.
(b) Model (iv) is more general than model (i).
(c) Model (iv) is strictly more general than model (iii). This means there exist problems where
model (iii) allows substantially smaller query complexity than model (iv).
Proof. We leave (a) for the end of the proof, and let us start with (b). Note that using one
query to the input oracle of model (i), it is possible to prepare that state
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉|xi〉 =
∑
a∈A
[
1√
n
∑
i:xi=a
|i〉
]
⊗ |a〉,
which is a legitimate input state in model (iv) if one swaps the registers.
Now let us prove (c). It is obvious that model (iv) is more general than model (iii). To prove
that (iii) cannot simulate (iv), consider the collision problem [16]. In this problem, a function
f : [n]→ [n] is given, and one has to distinguish whether f is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. In terms of model
(i), this boils down to distinguishing a probability distribution p which is uniform on [n] from
a probability distribution q which is uniform on half of [n].
In model (iii), this problem can be solved in O(1) queries because the state µp as in (3) has
inner product 1/
√
2 with all µq. On the other hand, by [1, 3], quantum query complexity of
this problem in model (i) is Ω(n1/3). As model (iv) is more general than model (i), this gives
the required lower bound.
To prove (a), we show that if one can distinguish models (i) and (ii), one can distinguish a
random function from a random permutation, and the result follows from the lower bound of
Ω(n1/3) for this task from [33]. Indeed, let p be a probability distribution and let y be a fixed
string encoding p as in model (i). Let σ : [n]→ [n] be a function, and consider the input string
x given by xi = yσ(i), which can be simulated given oracle access to σ (as the string y is fixed).
If σ is a random permutation, then x is a uniformly random input string from model (i). If σ
is a random function, then x is distributed as in model (ii).
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4 Distinguishing Two Probability Distributions
Recall the definition of Hellinger distance between two probability distributions p and q on the
same space A:
dH(p, q) =
√
1
2
∑
a∈A
(√
pa −√qa
)2
.
Up to a constant factor, it equals ‖µp − µq‖ and 1− 〈µp, µq〉, where µp and µq are as in (3).
In this section, we prove the following result:
Theorem 4. For any two probability distributions p and q on the same space A, and any model
of accessing them from Section 3, the quantum query complexity of distinguishing p and q is
Θ
(
1
dH(p, q)
)
.
Note that this is quadratically better than complexity of the best classical algorithm for
every choice of p and q. Note also that for this problem model (iii) is equal in strength to the
remaining models.
The proof of Theorem 4 involves proving lower and upper bounds in all four models, but,
luckily, we can use relations from Proposition 3. The outline of the proof is as follows. We prove
upper bound in model (iv), which implies upper bounds in all other models as model (iv) is the
most general of them. As for the lower bounds, we prove it for model (ii), which implies lower
bounds in models (i) and (iv). For model (iii), we prove the lower bound independently. As a
bonus, we prove an upper bound in model (iii) as a warm-up for the upper bound in model (iv).
In most of the proofs, we will use α for the angle between the vectors µp and µq. Note that
α = Θ(‖µp − µq‖) = Θ(dH(p, q)).
4.1 Analysis in Model (iii)
In this section, we analyse the problem in model (iii).
Claim 5. Quantum query complexity of distinguishing probability distributions p and q in model
(iii) is Θ
(
1/dH(p, q)
)
.
Proof. Let us start with the upper bound. Let O be the input oracle, and let U be a unitary that
maps |µp〉 into |0〉 and |µq〉 into cosα|0〉 + sinα|1〉. Now use quantum amplitude amplification
on the unitary UO amplifying for the value |1〉. The algorithm can be also made exact using
exact quantum amplitude amplification.
Now let us prove the lower bound. Let Op be the input oracle exchanging |0〉 and |µp〉 and
leaving the vectors orthogonal to them intact. Similarly, let Oq exchange |0〉 and |µq〉. Simple
linear algebra shows ‖Op − Oq‖ = O(α). (One way to see this is by using (10) and observing
that ‖Lµp − Lµq‖ = ‖µp − µq‖.) Let AO be a query algorithm making t queries to O and
distinguishing Op from Oq. Then,∥∥AOp −AOq∥∥ ≤ t‖Op −Oq‖ = O(tα).
As this must be Ω(1), we get that t = Ω(1/α).
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4.2 Upper Bound in Model (iv)
The aim of this section is to prove the following claim.
Claim 6. Quantum query complexity of distinguishing probability distributions p and q in model
(iv) is O
(
1/dH(p, q)
)
.
We prove this claim by constructing a feasible solution to (2). In Appendix B.2, we explain
how to implement this algorithm time-efficiently. In Appendix C, we give a comparison to an
algorithm using more typical techniques.
Let ψ and φ be some vectors encoding p and q, respectively, as in model (iv). That is,
ψ =⊞
a
√
paψa, and φ =⊞
a
√
qaφa,
where ψa and φa are some normalised vectors. Our goal is to come up with a feasible solution
to (2) with ψx and ψy replaced by ψ and φ.
We first analyse a pair of vectors
√
paψa and
√
qaφa for a fixed a. We would like to get a
construction in the spirit of (2) that “erases” directions ψa and φa, and only depends on the
norms
√
pa and
√
qa. One way is to use the following identity:〈√
paψa,
√
paψa −√qaφa
〉
+
〈√
paψa −√qaφa,√qaφa
〉
= pa − qa. (5)
We combine this identity over all a, add weights ca, and re-normalise:〈
⊞a ca
√
paψa
4
√∑
a c
2
apa
, (ψ − φ) · 4
√∑
c2apa
〉
+
〈
(ψ − φ) · 4
√∑
c2aqa,
⊞a ca
√
qaφa
4
√∑
a c
2
aqa
〉
=
∑
a
ca(pa − qa),
which gives
γ2
(∑
a
ca(pa − qa)
∣∣∣ Lψ − Lφ)
ψ,φ
≤
√∑
a
c2apa +
√∑
a
c2aqa.
Dividing by
∑
a ca(pa − qa), we get that complexity of distinguishing p from q is at most
O
(√∑
a c
2
apa +
√∑
a c
2
aqa∑
a ca(pa − qa)
)
. (6)
Using triangle inequality√∑
a
c2a(
√
pa +
√
qa)2 ≤
√∑
a
c2apa +
√∑
a
c2aqa ≤ 2
√∑
a
c2a(
√
pa +
√
qa)2,
so (6) is equivalent to
O
(√∑
a c
2
a(
√
pa +
√
qa)2∑
a ca(pa − qa)
)
.
Now it is easy to see that it is minimised to
O
(
1√∑
a(
√
pa −√qa)2
)
= O
(
1
dH(p, q)
)
when ca = (
√
pa −√qa)/(√pa +√qa).
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4.3 Lower Bound in Model (ii)
We use the following version of the adversary lower bound from [12].
Theorem 7. Assume A is a quantum algorithm that makes T queries to the input string
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D, with D = An, and then either accepts or rejects. Let P and Q be
two probability distributions on D, and px and qy denote probabilities of x and y in P and Q,
respectively. Let sP and sQ be acceptance probability of A when x is sampled from P and Q,
respectively. Then,
T = Ω
(
min
j∈[n]
δ∗PΓδQ − τ(sP , sQ)‖Γ‖
‖Γ ◦∆j‖
)
, (7)
for any D×D matrix Γ with real entries. Here, δP [[x]] = √px and δQ[[y]] = √qy are unit vectors
in RD; for j ∈ [n], the D ×D matrix ∆j is defined by ∆j[[x, y]] = 1xj 6=yj ; and
τ(sP , sQ) =
√
sP sQ +
√
(1− sP )(1− sQ) ≤ 1− |sP − sQ|
2
8
. (8)
In our case, δP = µ
⊗n
p and δQ = µ
⊗n
q . We construct Γ as a tensor power G
⊗n, where G is
an A×A matrix satisfying
Gµq = µp, ‖G‖ = 1, and ‖G ◦∆‖ is as small as possible,
where ∆ is the A×A matrix given by A[[a, b]] = 1a6=b. Then,
δ∗PΓδQ = ‖Γ‖ = 1, and ‖Γ ◦∆j‖ = ‖G ◦∆‖,
and Theorem 7 gives the lower bound of Ω
(
1/‖G ◦∆‖).
We construct G as follows. Recall that α is the angle between µq and µp. Then, G is rotation
by the angle α in the plane spanned by µq and µp and homothety with coefficient cosα on its
orthogonal complement. That is, in an orthonormal basis where the first two vectors span the
plane of µq and µp, we have
G =


cosα − sinα 0 · · · 0
sinα cosα 0 · · · 0
0 0 cosα · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · cosα

 .
Clearly, Gµq = µp and ‖G‖ = 1. Let G′ = G− cosα I. We have
‖G ◦∆‖ = ‖G′ ◦∆‖ ≤ 2‖G′‖ = 2 sinα = O(dH(p, q)).
For the inequality we used that γ2(∆) ≤ 2, see [27, Theorem 3.4]. This gives the required lower
bound.
5 Summary and Future Work
In this paper we considered quantum algorithms dealing with classical probability distributions.
We identified four different models, and proved various relations between them. We conjecture
that models (i), (ii) and (iv) are equivalent.
Also, we considered the problem of distinguishing two probability distributions and ob-
tained precise characterisation of its quantum query complexity in all four models in terms
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of Hellinger distance between the probability distributions. The complexity turned out to be
exactly quadratically smaller than the classical complexity of this problem for all pairs of dis-
tributions.
We showed that the corresponding algorithm can be implemented efficiently given that the
probability distributions p and q can be handled efficiently. We also compared our algorithm
with a more standard approach using rejection sampling and amplitude estimation.
This raises a number of interesting open problems. The first one is to prove or disprove the
conjecture that models (i) and (iv) are equivalent. Another interesting problem is to come up
with a nice γ2-characterisation of probability distribution oracles like Theorem 2 characterises
state-generating oracles. Unfortunately, we do not have any hypothesis of how this characteri-
sation might look like. Finally, we would be interested in further quantum algorithms based on
techniques of Section 4.2.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we freely use notions and results from [11], in particular Proposition 6 of that
paper stating various properties of the relative γ2-norm.
Fact 8. If Ox are unitaries, then γ2
(
O∗x −O∗y | Ox −Oy
)
= 1.
Proof. The upper bound follows from O∗x(Ox−Oy)(−O∗y) = −O∗y+O∗x. The lower bound follows
from the entry-wise lower bound property.
Theorem 2 follows from the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let Ox be a collection of unitaries in C
m+1, each preparing a state ψx ∈ Cm.
We have
γ2
(
Lψx − Lψy | Ox −Oy
)
x,y
≤ 1. (9)
And conversely, let Ψ be a collection of vectors in Cm. Then, for each ψ ∈ Ψ, it is possible to
define a operator Rψ preparing the state ψ so that
γ2
(
Rψ −Rφ | Lψ − Lφ
)
ψ,φ
≤ 3. (10)
Moreover, Rψ can be taken as the reflection through the orthogonal complement of e0 − ψ.
Let us explain how Theorem 2 follows from Proposition 9. Let f : D → {0, 1} be the function
corresponding to the decision problem. That is, f(x) = 0 for all x ∈ D0 and f(y) = 1 for all
y ∈ D1. By the striking out property, we have that
γ2(1 | Lψx − Lψy)x∈D0,y∈D1 ≤ γ2(1f(x)6=f(y) | Lψx − Lψy)x,y∈D.
On the other hand γ2
(
0 1
1 0
)
= 1, and the duplication and the Hadamard product properties
imply
γ2(1f(x)6=f(y) | Lψx − Lψy)x,y∈D ≤ γ2(1 | Lψx − Lψy)x∈D0,y∈D1 ,
hence, these two quantities are equal.
Let Ox be the oracle generating the state ψx (formally, we duplicate ψx for all possible Ox
generating the state). Then (9) and the composition property imply that
γ2(1f(x)6=f(y) | Ox −Oy)x,y∈D ≤ γ2(1f(x)6=f(y) | Lψx − Lψy)x,y∈D,
proving the upper bound. To prove the lower bound, we use (10) and the composition property:
γ2(1f(x)6=f(y) | Lψx − Lψy)x,y∈D ≤ 3 γ2(1f(x)6=f(y) | Rx −Ry)x,y∈D.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let us start with (9). First, we have
ψx − ψy = (Ox −Oy)e0 hence γ2
(
ψx − ψy | Ox −Oy
) ≤ 1.
Also, using Fact 8, we have
ψ∗x − ψ∗y = e∗0(O∗x −O∗y) hence γ2
(
ψ∗x − ψ∗y | Ox −Oy
) ≤ 1.
Using the direct sum property:
γ2
(
(ψx − ψy)⊕ (ψ∗x − ψ∗y) | Ox −Oy
) ≤ 1,
which is equivalent to (9).
Now let us prove (10). Note that L2ψ is the projector onto the 2-dimensional space spanned
by e0 and ψ, hence, we can write Rψ = Lψ + I − L2ψ. We have
Rψ −Rφ = Lψ − Lφ + L2φ − L2ψ = (Lψ − Lφ)− (Lψ − Lφ)Lφ − Lψ(Lψ − Lφ).
This gives (10) using triangle inequality for the relative γ2-norm.
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B Low-Level Details of Implementations
In this section, we sketch how the γ2-bound from Section 4.2 can be implemented as a quantum
algorithm. We first describe how to turn the general bound of Theorem 2 into an algorithm,
after that, the special case of Section 4.2 is straightforward.
The implementations follow a standard routine of implementing this kind of algorithms, and
rely on the following two results.
Lemma 10 (Effective Spectral Gap Lemma [27]). Let ΠA and ΠB be two orthogonal projectors
in the same vector space, and RA = 2ΠA − I and RB = 2ΠB − I be the reflections about their
images. Assume Pδ, where δ ≥ 0, is the orthogonal projector on the span of the eigenvectors of
RBRA with eigenvalues e
iθ such that |θ| ≤ δ. Then, for any vector w in the kernel of ΠA, we
have
‖PΘΠBw‖ ≤ δ
2
‖w‖.
Theorem 11 (Phase Estimation [25, 20]). Assume a unitary U is given as a black box. There
exists a quantum algorithm that, given an eigenvector ψ of U with eigenvalue eiφ, outputs a real
number w such that |w − φ| ≤ δ with probability at least 9/10. Moreover, the algorithm uses
O(1/δ) controlled applications of U and 1δ polylog(1/δ) other elementary operations.
B.1 Decision Problems with State-Preparing Oracles
Let us describe how to convert a feasible solution the optimisation problem of (2) into a quantum
algorithm that distinguishes D0 from D1. This is a standard implementation of adversary-like
algorithms.
The space of the algorithm is A ⊕ BCXW, where X and W correspond to the vector spaces
X and W, A is a 1-dimensional space, and B and C are qubits.
Let T be the objective value of (2), and 0 < ε < 1 be the error parameter. For each x ∈ D0
define a vector
µx = |0〉A +
ε√
T
[
|0〉
B
(
|0〉
C
∣∣(O∗x ⊗ I)vx〉XW + |1〉C|vx〉XW
)
+ |1〉
B
(
|0〉
C
|0〉
X
+ |1〉
C
|ψx〉X
)
|ux〉W
]
.
And let Λ be the projector onto the span of all µx. For z ∈ D, let Πz be the projection onto
the orthogonal complement of
IB ⊗ span
ϕ∈CX
(|0〉
C
|ϕ〉
X
− |1〉
C
|Ozϕ〉X
)⊗ IW.
The reflection about Πz can be implemented in two queries to Oz.
The algorithm performs phase estimation subroutine on the operator U = (2Λ− I)(2Πz− I)
and initial state |0〉
A
with precision ≈ ε2/T . The algorithm accepts if the detected phase is 0.
In the positive case z = x ∈ D0, there exists an eigenvalue-1 eigenvector of U with large
overlap with |0〉
A
, namely µx. So the phase estimation will report phase 0 with high probability.
In the negative case z = y ∈ D1, we use the Effective Spectral Gap Lemma with witness
wy = |0〉A−
√
T
ε
[
|0〉
B
(
|0〉
C
|0〉
X
− |1〉
C
|ψy〉X
)
|uy〉W+ |1〉B
(
−|0〉
C
∣∣(O∗y ⊗ I)vy〉XW+ |1〉C|vy〉XW
)]
.
We have Πywy = |0〉A, and, for all x ∈ D0, 〈µx, wy〉 = 0. Also,
‖wy‖ = O
(√
1 + T 2/ε2
)
= O(T ),
since T ≥ 1 and ε = Θ(1). By the Effective Spectral Gap Lemma, if we perform phase
estimation with precision δ = Θ(1/T ), we reject with high probability. This has complexity
O(1/δ) = O(T ).
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B.2 Implementation of the Algorithm
Let us briefly describe how the feasible solution from Section 4.2 can be implemented using
techniques of Appendix B.1. The main issue is to implement reflection about Λ. Let the oracle
register X be of the form D⊕ EF, where D is one-dimensional storing |0〉, E stores the index a,
and F stores the vectors ψa. The register W is one-dimensional in this case, so we will ignore it.
It is easy to see that Λ is the span of the vectors of the form
|0〉
A
+ |ν0〉BC|0〉D +
∑
a
|νa〉BC|a〉E|ψa〉F,
where νa are specific 4-dimensional vectors depending on pa and qa, and ψa are arbitrary vectors
of the norm
√
pa. This space breaks down into a direct sum of orthogonal subspaces:
|0〉
A
+ |ν0〉BC|0〉D and |νa〉BC|a〉E ⊗ IF.
Hence, it is easy to perform reflection about Λ, given that all the vectors νa can be efficiently
generated.
C Comparison to Standard Methods
It is interesting to compare the bound as derived in Section 4.2 to a more standard algorithm
involving quantum rejection sampling as in [22].
Assume we perform the following transformation involving the oracle in (4):
|0〉 7−→
∑
a
√
pa|a〉|ψa〉
(√
1− ca|0〉 +√ca|1〉
)
(11)
or
|0〉 7−→
∑
a
√
qa|a〉|φa〉
(√
1− ca|0〉 +√ca|1〉
)
, (12)
where 0 ≤ ca ≤ 1 are some real numbers. Then, we perform quantum amplitude estimation on
the value |1〉 of the last register. Since it is suboptimal to estimate simultaneously for a such
that pa < qa and a such that pa > qa, we may only consider those a for which pa ≥ qa.
Let Sp and Sq be probabilities of measuring 1 in the states from (11) and (12), respectively.
Using standard bounds from quantum amplitude estimation [15], we get that the required
number of queries is
O
( √
Sp
Sp − Sq
)
= O
( √∑
a capa∑
a ca(pa − qa)
)
. (13)
Compared to (6), the difference is that there is no square at ca in the numerator, but there is
restriction of ca ≤ 1. Since c2a ≤ ca for ca ≤ 1, the bound of (13) can only be worse than the
bound of (6).
Having no restriction on ca makes analysis simpler, and it is also possible to exhibit an
example where the separation between (13) and (6) is super-constant. Let t be a positive
integer, n = 1 + 4 + · · · + 4t−1, and α be a parameter we will specify later. We will define
probability distribution on a ∈ [2n]. Let pa = α for all a ∈ [n]. As for qa, they will be divided
into t consecutive groups of lengths 1, 4, . . . , 4t−1, respectively, such that all qa in the ith group
equal (1− 21−i)α. Finally, for i ∈ [n], let pa+n = qa and qa+n = pn. The scaling parameter α is
chosen so that both pa and qa form a probability distribution. Hence, α ≈ 1/2n.
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Let us first find the optimal value of √∑
a c
2
apa∑
a ca(pa − qa)
for this distribution. It is equal to √∑
a c
2
a√
α
∑
a cawa
=
‖u‖√
α〈u,w〉 ,
where w = (wa) is the vector(
1,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
, . . .
)
,
and u is the vector formed by ca. The optimal value is
1√
α‖w‖ = O
(√
n
log n
)
,
which is achieved when u = w.
Now let us consider the optimal value of√∑
a ca√
α
∑
a cawa
subject to 0 ≤ ca ≤ 1. It is easy to see that in an optimal solution there exists A such that
ca = 1 for a < A and ca = 0 for a > A. Hence, up to a constant, the optimal value is equal to
the minimum of ‖u‖√
α〈u,w〉 ,
where u ranges over all vectors of the form (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
The vector w breaks down into t groups composed of equal entries. The sum of the elements
in each of the t groups of w is twice the sum of the elements of the preceding group, hence, the
inner product 〈u,w〉 is at most 4 times the contribution of the last group fully covered by the
ones in u. Thus, we have
‖u‖√
α〈u,w〉 ≥
√
4i
4
√
α · 4i · 1/2i = Ω
( 1√
α
)
= Ω(
√
n).
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